

700 SECRET DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/WR
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DRAFT LETTER, PARKER TO [redacted] EXT. DATE August 3, 1951

Dear Art:

In anticipation of Nordstrom's arrival for consultation and approval of our problems in the field of science, I would like to give you a brief summary of the current situation. I think this is important because we have reason to believe that the Department may not have a complete picture and I wish to fill you in before Nordstrom's arrival.

Immediately prior to his departure for the States, Ben Shute brought JIOA's project 63 to my attention. This is essentially a "Denial Program" for getting key German scientists out of this area. It was his opinion that the manner in which the project was being handled would probably defeat its own purpose, but, more serious, it would have an adverse effect on other US objectives and possibly give rise to serious political repercussions. There are two aspects to the problem, that concerned with implementation of the project, and that of the objective of the project itself. With respect to implementation, JIOA, in violation of the present formally established definition of responsibility between State and JCS regarding this sort of operation, and apparently without having made efforts to modify these terms of reference (JCS to GUNCSUR, April 27, 1950, State to LEB December 16, 1949, No 1045, attached), instituted Project 63 making EUCOM responsible therefore. This was done without knowledge of HICOG. EUCOM, not organized to handle such matters, turned the matter over to Intelligence where it became a troublesome part-time assignment of a Lt. Colonel who does not understand the implications and has small interest in the responsibilities thrust upon him. JIOA complicated the program still further by sending contact officers into Germany who were directly responsible to JIOA and not to EUCOM. These men were not briefed in any aspect of the problem other than JIOA's desire for rapid consummation of recruitment contracts. One recruitment officer got into rather serious personal difficulties immediately upon arrival and was killed without ever having made a contact. Another man (Martin Surman), a reserve officer who had war-time experience in a similar operation, was called to active duty and sent over as a contract negotiator and contact man. For clearing purposes, he came as a civilian, ostensibly

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in the pursuit of his private business as a diamond merchant from Los Angeles and used his own business card in asking interviews. He called on about 110 top German scientists, apparently handled himself well, and applied himself with great energy to the discharge of his mission. However, you can imagine the reaction in German scientific circles of having a stranger and a diamond merchant, calling on the most outstanding men of German science, including Nobel prize winners, offering a dubious contract in the name of the US government. News spread quickly and a substantial number, (20 or more) scientists made inquiries in HICOG as to whether this was a bona fide offer, what the significance of it was, etc., and, in most cases, asked counsel as to whether the contract should be accepted. So much for implementation of the project.

As to the objective, we are handicapped by lack of information but would like to call your attention to the political hazards inherent in such a program being launched ^{which} has not been coordinated with us and which, if successful, would ^{remove} take from 150 to 200 of the best scientists in all fields that Germany now has. Such a program would have to be rationalized with our efforts to assist German education and ^{re-}establish German science. For instance, Project 63, if successful, would have wiped out the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin by taking its four top men, when, at the same time, we have been putting pressure on EUCOM to release the Max Planck facilities in Heidelberg so that the cyclotron there can again be put into operation for medical research. News of these contacts spread very rapidly among the profession and there was anxious and apprehensive conjecture as to the significance of the US embarking upon this program at this particular time. Perhaps such reaction could not be completely avoided but it is our opinion that the major disturbance resulted from the inept planning of the operation and could have been avoided. It is also our opinion that it is only the relative failure of Project 63 which has prevented more serious consequences developing.

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One more point as to implementation: the contract offered is poorly adapted for current use and is an old "Paper Clip" contract which was used when "recruitment" was effected by duress, if not willingly accepted. We are fortified in our beliefs by the fact that Mr. Sarman came to realize through his experience in contacting scientists, how ill-conceived and badly coordinated the operation was, and voluntarily gave us a full report which corroborated our thoughts in every respect. He stated that he would make an identical report, both to HICOG and JIOA. This report probably has been made by this time as Sarman left for the States about a week ago.

The Department's reply, Airgram 205 of July 18, replying to our cable to the Department No. 10457 of June 23, leaves us with the feeling that the Department may not understand the situation for it gives no cognizance to the present division of responsibilities between HICOG and the Services and, in stating that no further coordination is necessary, takes a position opposite to that of AFM, Air Forces, Navy and NSB representatives here in a meeting held on July 18th when HICOG was unanimously requested to accept the position of coordinator.

(Cable HICOG to EUCOM, 13 July, attached)
As a result of this meeting, HICOG offered Nordstrom as temporary coordinator of this project. We named Nordstrom because we did not wish to complicate the HICOG organizational picture further by naming someone not connected directly with scientific work. Dr. Weber of Intelligence is not available as Shute, quite rightly, says this is not an Intelligence function. We use the word "temporary" as indication that we do not wish to make any organizational changes in the scientific field until the matter can be reviewed by, or for, Dr. Koepfli.

The foregoing gives you general background for discussion with Nordstrom and JIOA. Our feeling is that coordination of such Projects as 63 is imperative.

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With respect to organization within HSCG for scientific functions in the future, I would like to point out that the Scientific Research Division of Military Security Board has inherited from GSEC, and officially continued positive functions concerned with the encouragement of scientific development in the Federal Republic, in addition to the restrictive operation contained in the Military Security Board mandate. In fact, approximately 75% of the personnel in the Scientific Research Division are exclusively engaged in positive functions which are directly related to the functions as set forth in the Berkner report. Because of this, we assume that the Scientific Research Division will have to be reorganized ^{as} part of the organizational planning coupled with the establishment of the Scientific Attaché (Advisor) functions and both functions continued with MSB retaining only those restrictive functions contained in the contractals.

We feel that the Scientific Advisor will find it difficult to establish and maintain the relationship ^{we} ~~we~~ should have with German scientists unless he directly commands all positive functions.